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NOTE
STOP BEING EVIL: A PROPOSAL FOR
UNBIASED GOOGLE SEARCH
Joshua G. Hazan*
Since its inception in the late 1990s, Google has done as much as anyone
to create an "open internet." Thanks to Google's unparalleled search al-
gorithms, anyone's ideas can be heard, and all kinds of information are
easier than ever to find. As Google has extended its ambition beyond its
core function, however it has conducted itself in a manner that now
threatens the openness and diversity of the same internet ecosystem that it
once championed. By promoting its own content and vertical search ser-
vices above all others, Google places a significant obstacle in the path of
its competitors. This handicap will only be magnified as search engines
become increasingly important and the internet continues to expand.
In order to mitigate the potential damage to competition, we must prevent
Google from leveraging its power in core search to steal market share for
its downstream vertical search services. Requiring Google core search to
integrate its competitors' vertical offerings would promote competition
without intrusive administrative interference. But action must come soon.
Search is taking shape very quickly. Once the next generation of online
search emerges, the dominant players will have already cemented their po-
sitions. Let us hope that when the dust settles it isn't too late.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a query for "Michigan Wolverines Football" that yields jerseys
from Amazon, game statistics and the team injury report from ESPN, Coach
Hoke's latest press conference from YouTube, and game tickets from Stub-
Hub all on the same page. Such a search experience would be truly
universal.' Indeed, Google is increasingly moving toward a universal model
with its "core" search 2 but all of its integrated "vertical" services 3 are pub-
lished by Google itself. Because Google has such great market power in
core search, the integration raises competitive concerns that Google is lever-
aging its dominance in core search to gain market share in vertical search.
Since its inception, Google has been largely celebrated for its contribu-
tions toward the progress of the internet. Indeed, Google has been a great
pioneer in the digital age by making the internet's vast stores of information
accessible to average users. A loyal contingent of users has rewarded
Google for its tremendous innovation, making it the most frequently visited
website in the world.4 Its name has become a generic verb, synonymous
with "to search the internet."5 It ranks among the twenty most valuable pub-
lic companies in the world,6 and it continues to grow at a torrid pace.7 Yet
the past year has brought Google unwanted attention as well. It has begun to
face scrutiny for the anticompetitive nature of some of its business practices,
both in the United States8 and in the European Union.9 In particular, Google
has come under fire for giving preferential treatment to its own proprietary
1. See infra text accompanying note 173.
2. "Core" search refers to a broad internet search, such as through Google or Bing.
3. "Vertical" search refers to specialized search engines in areas like maps, shopping,
travel, et cetera, such as Kayak, Google Maps, or Price Grabber.
4. Top Sites: The Top 500 Sites on the Web, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites
(last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
5. The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) [hereinafter Google Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hear-
ing] (statement of Sen. Michael S. Lee).
6. The World's Biggest Public Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/global2000/
list/#pl-sd6_All%20industries_AIl%20countriesAII%20states (data as of Apr. 2012) (sort-
ed by "market value").
7. Google has acquired at least fifty companies since 2010 alone. List of Mergers and
Acquisitions by Google, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-ofacquisitions-by-
Google (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
8. Jia Lynn Yang, Google Faces Antitrust Glare on Capitol Hill, WASH. POST, Sept.
20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.comlbusiness/economy/googlefaces-antitrust-glare-on-
capitol-hill/2011/09/20/gIQAFUuKjK.story.html.
9. Foo Yun Chee, Expedia Files Google Complaint to EU Regulators, REUTERS, Mar.




services over those of its downstream competitors.' 0 This favoritism creates
the potential for foreclosure."
Antitrust law promotes free market competition by regulating anticom-
petitive conduct by companies in positions of power. 12 Its overarching
purpose in doing so is to increase consumer welfare.13 In the United States,
anticompetitive conduct by a single firm is governed primarily under § 2 of
the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopo-
lize.14 Although the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") recently dropped its
investigation, 5 competition authorities around the world continue to investi-
gate Google because of concerns that its practice of favoring its own
products will foreclose existing and potential competitors, thus allowing
Google to maintain and extend its market power.'6
This Note argues that by favoring its own proprietary ("vertical") ser-
vices in its general ("core") search results, Google violates the spirit, if not
the letter, of U.S. competition laws. Part I explores Google's role within the
greater internet ecosystem and weighs the potential consequences of Google
hard-coding its own services at the top of the results page. Part II explains
how Google's conduct does in fact violate § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of
the FTC Act, despite the FTC finding otherwise, and identifies instances in
which analogous conduct has been found illegal in the past. Part III propos-
es a remedy to Google's search bias modeled after the Department of
Justice's settlement with Microsoft, whereby Google is required to allow
competing publishers to integrate their services into a Google core search
when a user so desires.17 Finally, Part IV examines the criticisms that polic-
ing Google is unnecessary and concludes that they are unconvincing.
10. Id.
11. See Thomas Catan & Amir Efrati, Feds to Launch Probe of Google, WALL ST. J.,
June 24, 2011, at Al, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023033399045764
03603764717680.html.
12. MARTYN D. TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 1 (2006).
13. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-3
(2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report-recommendation/amc-final
_report.pdf.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 33, 193 (2d
ed. 2001).
15. See Edward Wyatt, A Victory for Google as FTC. Takes No Formal Steps, N.Y
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, at Al, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/technology/google-agrees-to-
changes-in-search-ending-us-antitrust-inquiryhtml.
16. E.g., Diane Bartz, FTC Expands Google Antitrust Probe: Source, REUTERS,
Jan. 13, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/us-google-ftc-
idUSTRE8OC2JH20120113; James Kanter, Pressure Grows on Europe to Act Against
Google, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/O3/28/technology/
pressure-grows-on-eu-to-act-against-gongle.html; Antitrust Regulators Raid Google's Offices
in South Korea, B.B.C. (Sep. 7, 201 1),http://www'bbc'couk/news/business-14816295.
17. This Note is not the first publication to propose an interoperability-based remedy.
The foundation was laid by Benjamin Edelman. See Benjamin Edelman, Bias in Search Re-
sults?: Diagnosis and Response, 7 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 16, 29-30 (2011) (India).
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I. GOOGLE'S ABILITY TO DIRECT INTERNET TRAFFIC
The advent of Google substantially improved the searchability and usa-
bility of the internet and thereby decentralized the flow of information. This
Part argues, however, that Google has since become a bottleneck for the
flow of information on the internet, and that it has exploited this power to
disproportionately direct internet users to Google's own content.
In the 1990s, the internet was extremely disorganized and its potential
unrealized. There was a limited quantity and variety of content available,
and accessing that content was often an arduous task. The search engines of
the day, such as Lycos and Webcrawler, brought users results based on the
number of times their keywords appeared, which severely limited their ef-
fectiveness. 8 For instance, a search for "Microsoft" might have shown the
websites of vendors who sold Microsoft products before Microsoft's own
website. Thus, the relatively tiny internet remained highly fragmented and
information was often difficult to find. Internet users often needed to know
what was available before even commencing their searches, and web pages
drew traffic by proliferating their brands through conventional media.
Larry Page and Sergey Brin, Google's cofounders, changed all this.
They developed an algorithm that ranks web results based on "relevance,"
which represents some combination of the web page's presence in links
from other sites and its popularity with users searching similar queries.19
Introduced in beta form in 1998, Google quickly drew praise for returning
better results, despite indexing just a fraction as many web pages as its
competitors. 20 Its subsequent success has been well documented. By 2000,
Google had indexed over a billion web pages, 21 and by the time of its initial
public offering ("IPO") in 2004, it was responsible for processing 84.7 per-
cent of all search queries on the internet.22 Google helped pioneer a world
where internet users don't need to know exactly what they are searching for
before they search, and the company now enjoys the third-highest market
capitalization among U.S. tech companies because of it.23 Yet at the same
time, Google's corporate pledge-called "Don't Be Evil"-promises em-
18. See David Hart, On the Origins of Google, NAT'L Sci. FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2004),
http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc-summ.jsp?cntn-id=100660.
19. Id.
20. Scott Rosenberg, Let's Get This Straight: Yes There Is a Better Search Engine, SA-
LON (Dec. 21, 1998, 3:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/1998/12/2I/straighL44/.
21. We Knew the Web Was Big ... , GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (July 25, 2008), http:/I
googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we-knew-web-was-big.html#!/2008/07/we-knew-web-was-
big.html.
22. MOHAMMAD BAHARETH, ISAY: KINGS OF THE INTERNET 28 (2010).
23. See Matt Rosoff, Google's Market Cap Could Soon Pass Microsoft's, Bus. INSIDER




phasizing ethics over profits. The preface of the pledge specifically states
that Google's services should give users "unbiased access to information."
24
Despite the internet's promise as a vehicle for decentralized speech,
2 5
"bottlenecks" have emerged through which internet traffic must pass. Inter-
net service providers ("ISPs") like Comcast, which own and operate the
physical bandwidth through which data transmission occurs,2 6 were the first
such bottlenecks. There existed a real danger that ISPs would be able to
slow down or block data transmission for entities that competed with them
until the Federal Communications Commission implemented "net neutrali-
ty" regulations proscribing ISPs from providing preferential transmission to
those who pay for it.27 Google, in fact, spearheaded the net neutrality
movement, thus ensuring that ISPs couldn't decide the internet's winners
and losers. 28 The following comes from Google's own Public Policy Blog:
[I]nnovation has thrived online because the Internet's architecture enables
any and all users to generate new ideas and technologies, which are al-
lowed to succeed based on their own merits and benefits. Some major
broadband service providers have threatened to act as gatekeepers, playing
favorites with particular applications or content providers, demonstrating
that this threat is all too real. It's no stretch to say that such discriminatory
practices could have prevented Google from getting off the ground-and
they could prevent the next Google from ever coming to be.29
More recently, search engines have emerged as a new form of bottle-
neck.3" The owners of these bottlenecks can be likened to gatekeepers who
"directly manipulate the flow of information-suppressing some sources
while highlighting others-whether on the basis of intrinsic preferences or
in response to inducements or pressures by others."' The unstructured na-
ture of the internet makes this so. Google estimates that there are over one
trillion unique URLs in existence with that number growing by several bil-
lion every day.32 Indeed, there is so much content that without an easy way
to navigate through it, the vast majority of content would never be found.
This would neutralize much of the internet's potential; but search engines fill
24. Investor Relations: Code of Conduct, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.coml
corporate/code-of-conduct.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
25. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1157 (2008).
26. ISP, WEBOPEDIA.COM, http://www.webopedia.com/term/i/ISP.html (last visited Oct.
11,2012).
27. 47 C.F.R. §§ 8.1, 8.3, 8.5, 8.7, 8.9, 8.11-8.17 (2012).
28. Richard Waters, Net Neutrality Comes Back to Haunt Google, FIN. TIMES, July 23,
2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9b6bc780-8ea5-1 ldf-8a67-00l44feab49a.html#axzz
lqoZhgk6Q.
29. Derek Slater, Rep. Markey's Net Neutrality Legislation, GOOGLE PUa. POL'Y BLOG
(Feb. 13, 2008, 2:29 PM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2008/02/rep-markeys-net-
neutrality-legislation.html.
30. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1165.
31. Id.
32. We Knew the Web Was Big..., supra note 21.
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the internet's structural void. A quick Google search for "Nike" yields links to
sites selling Nike products, a map of local dealers, a compilation of news arti-
cles, and a stock quote for the company.33 Such a service is invaluable to
internet users and publishers alike. Yet that same necessity gives Google its
power.
In the United States, Google is used for nearly two-thirds of all internet
search queries.34 In Europe, that number is closer to 95 percent.3 This dom-
inance puts Google in a unique position to direct internet traffic. In fact, a
page's rank within Google's core search results is strongly correlated with
that page's web traffic.3 6 Google's defenders suggest that this strong correla-
tion is simply indicative of Google's superior "business acumen"-that is, it
places the most relevant sites first.37 However, this ignores the strong deter-
minant effect a page's ranking can have on its traffic. Most users likely
assume that the first few results for a given query are the most relevant ones
and do not bother to question this assumption unless the link they choose
differs dramatically from the content that they expected. Because the first
few results attract the vast majority of clicks, Google has the ability to direct
traffic on the internet. And since advertising revenue-the lifeblood of most
web pages-is tied to a website's traffic, Google is in a position to decide
whose content flourishes and whose flounders.3 8 Oren Bracha and Frank
Pasquale assert that with so many billions of web pages, "where both com-
mercial and non-commercial speakers place great weight on attracting users'
attention, a high [search] ranking is critical to success.
39
Of course, this is not entirely a bad thing. Google's ability to help inter-
net users discern the best sites from the rest is precisely what gives the
33. "Nike" Search Results, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/#hl=en&output=search&
sclient=psy-ab&q=Nike&oq=Nike&aq=f&aqi=g4&aql=&gsjl=hp.3..014.30207130619101308
69141410101010114814571 lj31410.frgbld.&pbx=l &bav=on.2,or.r.gc.r pw.rqf.,cf.osb&fp=62dd
1390a3550b6f&biw=690&bih=624 (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
34. Press Release, comScore, comScore Releases February 2012 U.S. Search Engine
Rankings (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://www.comscore.com/Press-Events/Press-
Releases/2012/3/comScoreReleasesFebruary_2012_U.S._SearchEngineRankings.
35. Top 5 Search Engines in Europe from Apr 2011 to Mar 2012, STATCOUNTER
GLOBALSTATS, http://gs.statcounter.com/#search-engine-eu-monthly-201104-201203 (last
visited Apr. 11, 2012).
36. Although the numbers are not updated regularly, in 2006 the top three results on a
Google search enjoyed 79 percent of clicks. Distribution of Clicks on Google's SERPs,
ONLINE MARKETING RES. (Oct. 26, 2006), http://www.seoresearcher.com/distribution-of-
clicks-on-googles-serps-and-eye-tracking-analysis.htm. In his statement during the Senate's
antitrust subcommittee hearing in September 2011, Senator Mike Lee estimated the share of
the first few results to be 90 percent today. Google Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing,
supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Sen. Michael S. Lee).
37. Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Google, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 2012, § 1, at 19,
http://artictes.chicagotribune.comV20l2-04-06/news/ct-perspec-0405-bork-20120406-1 unpaid-
search-results-search-engines-search-algorithms.
38. See Google Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of
Sen. Michael S. Lee) ("Given its dominant position, most internet-based businesses rely on
Google for a substantial share of their traffic in revenues.").
39. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1165.
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search engine its value. We want Google to pick the winners and losers for
us so that we don't have to waste time sifting through the losers ourselves.
But we also need to be able to trust that Google is showing us the most "rel-
evant" results and not engaging in something more nefarious, which is
where Google leads its users astray. Google leads its users to believe that its
"organic" search results are based on "math" (algorithmic relevance), but
this is in many cases false. Google determines relevance by combining
algorithmic and editorial decisions, which means that many factors, in-
cluding subjective ones, can influence a website's ranking on the results
page.40 For instance, a site can be demoted for punitive reasons, such as
trying to manipulate the search engine through a practice called "search
engine optimization. '41 Its ranking could also theoretically be altered for
political reasons, such as censorship.4 2 But perhaps the most dangerous
and the most realized risk is of Google manipulating rankings based on its
own commercial interests.43 This manipulation frequently occurs when
Google elevates its own proprietary services to the top of a search query,
despite the fact that another result fits better with conventional notions of
"relevance." For example, as Benjamin Edelman and Benjamin Lockwood
have demonstrated, searches for "email," "maps," and "video" bring up
Google's Gmail, Google Maps, and Google Videos applications as the first
result for each. 44 Similarly, it is no coincidence that the results for "Nike,"
mentioned earlier in this Section, yielded a local map through Google Maps,
store listings through Google Places, and news results through Google
News. Indeed, in 1998 before Google's initial public offering, its founders
acknowledged the potential for commercial interests to bias search engine
results.
45
40. How Google Search Works, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/competition/
howgooglesearchworks.htm] (last visited Nov. 2, 2012); see also Benjamin Edelman, Hard-
Coding Bias in Google "Algorithmic" Search Results, BENEDELMAN.ORG (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://www.benedelman.org/hardcoding/ ("I present categories of searches for which available
evidence indicates Google has 'hard-coded' its own links to appear at the top of algorithmic
search results .... ").
41. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1169-70. "Search engine optimization"
refers to the practice among site owners of hiring consultants to modify characteristics of
their website to receive more favorable treatment within a search engine's algorithm. See
generally Webmaster Tools: Search Engine Optimization (SEO), GOOGLE, http://
support.google.com/webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=3529l (last updated Mar. 15,
2012).
42. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1171-73.
43. See id. at 1170.
44. Benjamin Edelman & Benjamin Lockwood, Measuring Bias in "Organic" Web
Search, BENEDELMAN.ORG (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias/. It is worth
mentioning that Edelman consults for Microsoft, Benjamin Edelman - Biography, BENEDEL-
MAN.ORG, http://www.benedelman.org/bio/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2012), which is one of the
complainants in the Google investigation, Chee, supra note 9.
45. Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web
Search Engine, STANFORD UNIV. INFOLAB, app. A at 18-19 (1998), http://
ilpubs.stanford.edu:80901361 / 1 998-8.pdf.
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These editorial decisions, which "hard-code" Google's own services
above those of its competitors, often go against conventional notions of
relevance and can help defeat a competitor with a superior product. For
instance, MapQuest was once the most popular service for internet maps
with 57 percent of the share for online mapping in 2007.46 By most con-
ventional notions of relevance it should have been the first mapping site to
appear.47 However, immediately following Google's integration of Google
Maps into its core search results, Google Maps's market share skyrocketed,
primarily at the expense of MapQuest's. 48 MapQuest was decimated instant-
ly, not necessarily because Google's product was better on the merits but
because it enjoyed an advantage in terms of its exposure on Google's core
search.49 And MapQuest is far from an isolated victim. When Google
launched Google Finance in 2008, Yahoo! Finance was by far the most pop-
ular source for financial information on the internet. 0 Google Finance did
not even rank among the top ten5' but was listed atop Google's search re-
sults for ticker symbols and has since surged through the ranks at the
expense of sites like MSN Money and Forbes.52 Google Shopping was simi-
larly struggling until Google pinned it to the top of its core search results.
53
Google imposes algorithmic penalties on legitimate websites that com-
pete with Google's services-particularly "vertical search" sites.54 By giving
46. Traffic Report: How Google Is Squeezing Out Competitors and Muscling into New
Markets, CONSUMER WATCHDOG, 5 (June 2, 2010), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/
resources/TrafficStudy-Google.pdf [hereinafter Google Traffic Report].
47. Even Google executives sometimes conflate "popularity" with "relevance." See
Google Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 5, at 9 (statement of Sen. Herb
Kohl) (quoting former Google Vice President Marissa Mayer).
48. For a depiction of MapQuest's demise, see Google Traffic Report, supra note 46, at
6.
49. This claim would be difficult to prove empirically, but Shivaun and Adam Raff have
shown that before Google Maps overtook MapQuest, MapQuest was a significantly more
popular subject of online search. Cade Metz, Why the Google Antitrust Complaint Is Not
About Microsoft: It's About 'Bundling' Services with a Search Monopoly, REGISTER (Mar. 29,
2010), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/03/29/foundem fcc-filing-on-google/.
50. Press Release, comScore, Yahoo! Finance Ranks as Top Financial News & Re-
search Site in the U.S. with More than 18 Million Visitors in May, According to comScore
(Jul. 9, 2008), available at http://www.comscore.com/PressEvents/PressReleases/2008/07/
Yahoo!_FinanceTopFinancialNews-andResearchSite inUS.
51. Id.
52. See Top 15 Most Popular Business Websites, EBIz MBA, http://www.ebizmba.coml
articles/business-websites (last updated Oct. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Fifteen Most Popular
Business Websites].
53. Google's Transformation from Gateway to Gatekeeper: How Google's
Exclusionary and Anticompetitive Conduct Restricts Innovation and Deceives Consumers,
FAIRSEARCH, 23 (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.fairsearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/li/
Googles-Transformation-from-Gateway-to-Gatekeeper-Edited.pdf [hereinafter Gateway to
Gatekeeper].
54. Adam Raff, Op-Ed., Search but You May Not Find, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 28, 2009, at
A27, http://www.nytimes.comv2009/12/28/opinion/28raff.htm. Adam Raff is an outspoken
[Vol. 111:789
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preference to its own products in the search rankings, Google is able to
dominate markets for services for which there are much more popular, and
in turn presumably much more relevant, competitors and industry leaders.
Given how strongly a Google ranking not only correlates with but also de-
termines a website's traffic, this advantage is likely unassailable. Further,
Google's dominant search position allows it to topple established industry
leaders, like MapQuest, virtually overnight.55
Recently, Google has faced a surplus of unwelcome attention both in the
United States and Europe over the threat posed by search bias. In response
to complaints by competing publishers, the European Commission and the
Federal Trade Commission launched large-scale investigations into
Google for anticompetitive practices. 56 The FTC has since closed its inves-
tigation, citing insufficient evidence to support an antitrust case, 57 but its
European counterparts remain undeterred.5 8 Google also faced a number of
congressional hearings in the United States during 2011..9 As Senator Mike
Lee of Utah, the ranking Republican on the Senate antitrust subcommittee
explained, Google has "cooked it" so that its own products and services are
given priority in its search results over those of competing companies.
60
Former Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin, a Democrat, and until January of
this year, chairman of the antitrust subcommittee, voiced similar concerns
regarding Google's recent acquisitions of content providers such as ITA
travel software 61 and restaurant-review company Zagat. He asked, in light
of these acquisitions, "Does Google's transformation create an inherent
conflict of interest which threatens to stifle competition?"
62
I would answer Senator Kohl with a resounding "yes." Google's desire
to obtain more traffic by prioritizing its own services in its search results
threatens to stifle competition and ultimately hurt consumers. Today,
advocate for "search neutrality" and the founder of British shopping site-and Google hard-
coding victim-Foundem.
55. Id.
56. James Kanter, European Antitrust Inquiry into Google Is Broadened, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2010, at B2, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/technology/18google.html?_r=-I;
Edward Wyatt & Miguel Helft, FTC. Said Near a Move on Google, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2011, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/technology/24ftc.html?scp=2&sq=ftc%20
google&st=cse.
57. Wyatt, supra note 15.
58. David Jolly, Europe Likely to Be Harder on Google over Search,N.Y TIMES, Jan. 4,
2013, at B6, http://www.nytimes.com/20l3/01/05/technology/europe-likely-to-be-harder-on-
google-over-search.html.
59. See Thomas Catan & Siobhan Hughes, Google Defends Dominance, WALL S'r. J.,
Sept. 22, 2011, at BI.
60. Id.
61. Letter to the Honorable Christine A. Varney (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://
www.kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease.cfm?customel-dataPagelD_1464=4102.
62. Catan & Hughes, supra note 59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Google's own words about net neutrality 63 can just as easily describe its own
exclusionary conduct in search.
II. APPLICABILITY OF ANTITRUST LAW
This Part argues that Google's practice of prioritizing its own services in
its search results runs afoul of federal antitrust law. Section II.A explains the
requirements of § 2 of the Sherman Act, which governs monopolization, and
§ 5 of the FTC Act, which is at least coextensive with § 2. Section II.B con-
tends that Google's conduct violates these laws.
A. Sources ofAntitrust Law
The Sherman Act is the foundation for most competition law in the
United States. 4 Its fundamental purpose is to promote "a market-based
economy that increases economic growth and maximizes the wealth and
prosperity of our society."6 5 It achieves this purpose by preserving competi-
tion, which spurs companies to reduce costs, improve the quality of their
products, and innovate for future products, all of which improve consumer
welfare.66
The abuse of monopoly power is governed by § 2 of the Sherman Act.
Section 2 says it shall be unlawful for any person to "monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations.' 67 Monopolies are undesirable because they
have a tendency to raise prices while reducing output, quality, and innova-
tion, which all harm consumers.
68
63. Slater, supra note 29.
64. See Antitrust: An Overview, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., http://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
65. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 7 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/reports/236681.pdf. The comprehensive report, compiled under the Bush Admin-
istration, has since been "withdrawn" by the Obama Administration. The Obama
Administration has sought tougher enforcement against anticompetitive single-firm conduct,
viewing the report's enforcement guidelines as too defendant friendly. Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11,
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2009/245710.htm. The
legal principles cited in this Note are unrelated to the policy shift and thus remain unaffected.
66. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 65, at 1.
67. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
68. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911) (citing the
danger that a monopoly will "fix the price" impose a "limitation on production," or cause a
"deterioration in quality of the monopolized article"); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SHERMAN ACT SECTION 2 JOINT HEARING UNDERSTANDING SINGLE-FIRM
BEHAVIOR: EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES SESSION 13 (2006) (statement of F. Michael Scherer)
(observing that reluctance "to cannibalize the rents that they are earning on the products that
they already have marketed" may make monopolists "sluggish innovators"). See generally
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In order to violate § 2 of the Sherman Act, a firm's unilateral conduct
must meet two requirements. First, the firm must already possess or have "a
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power."6 9 From an economic
standpoint, monopoly power means "the power to control prices or exclude
competition. '70 Second, the firm must acquire or attempt to acquire monopo-
ly power through improper means,71 since "size does not determine guilt" on
its own under the Sherman Act.7' This makes sense, because as the Supreme
Court established in United States v. Grinnell Corp., monopoly power can
result from "growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident."
7 3
An important factor in determining whether a firm possesses monopoly
power is the firm's share in the relevant product market. The relevant prod-
uct market is defined as the market for all products that are "reasonably
interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes."74 Though there is no
definitive threshold for the market share of a monopoly, courts have estimat-
ed that a market share between 70 and 90 percent is indicative of a
monopoly,75 while 50 percent is the absolute minimum for a finding of mo-
nopoly.76 Of course, market share is not an absolute litmus test for a firm's
ability to control prices and exclude competitors. Therefore, dominant mar-
ket share is never a sufficient condition for a finding of monopoly power.
77
For example, if smaller firms in the market can readily ramp up production
in response to a reduction by the high-share firm, the high-share firm is un-
likely to be found to possess market power because it will not be able to
readily control prices.
78
The second requirement for a § 2 violation-anticompetitive con-
duct-may take a variety of different forms, but tying and bundling are
particularly relevant to this Note. Tying occurs when a firm sells a product in
one ("tying") market in which it has market power, only on the condition that
the buyer also purchases that firm's offering in a separate ("tied") product
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 65 (discussing § 2 of the Sherman Act with the goal of
articulating the standards used for evaluating single-firm conduct).
69. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 65, at 5-6.
70. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
71. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 65, at 5-6.
72. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945)
(L. Hand, J.).
73. 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
74. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. See United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005); Colo.
Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 694 n.18 (10th Cir.
1989); Exxon Corp. v. Berwick Bay Real Estate Partners, 748 F.2d 937, 939-40 (5th Cir.
1984) (per curiam); Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 424.
76. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 65, at 21-22.
77. Id. at 22.
78. Seeid. at 23.
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market.79 Tying hurts competition in the tied market because firms in the
tied market are unable to compete for customers who purchase the tying
product.80 Similarly, "bundling" is a strategy by which a firm operating in
two distinct product markets---dominant in at least one of them-prices a
bundle of products 81 from both markets such that that it does not make eco-
nomic sense for consumers to purchase from the firm's "equally efficient"
single-market competitors.1
2
The foregoing is not an exhaustive list of the many forms that anticom-
petitive conduct may take, as the Sherman Act does not specify exactly
which types of conduct should be found exclusionary. Nevertheless,
"[w]ithin the context of § 2 claims, the Supreme Court has recognized the
impropriety of monopoly leveraging, i.e., the use of monopoly power in one
market to strengthen a monopoly share in another market."8 3 A claim of mo-
nopoly leveraging exists when the plaintiff can show that the defendant
"threatens the [second] market with the higher prices or reduced output or
quality associated with the kind of monopoly that is ordinarily accompanied
by a large market share." 4
Congress, through § 5 of the FTC Act, gave the Commission the power
to detect and prohibit "unfair methods of competition." 5 U.S. courts have
interpreted § 5 as enabling the FTC "to proscribe behavior beyond conduct
prohibited by the other federal antitrust statutes, including Section 2."86
79. Id. at 77.
80. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 140 (1936) (prohibiting IBM from enforc-
ing a lease provision in contracts for IBM tabulating machines that required lessees to buy
tabulating cards for the machines from IBM exclusively because the provisions hurt competi-
tion in the tied market).
81. The bundle can either be "pure"-meaning that the products are exclusively availa-
ble as a bundle-or "mixed"-meaning that the dominant firm also makes each product
available separately. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 324 (4th ed. 2005).
82. Barry Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 321, 321 (2005)
("Under exclusionary bundling, a firm with market power in good A and facing actual (or
potential) competition in good B prices an A-B bundle in a way that makes it impossible for
equally-efficient one-good rivals selling B to compete."); see also Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc.
v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing a hypothetical bundle
of shampoo and conditioner); Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consum-
er Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423, 443-46 (2006) (discussing "several important assumptions
and limitations" to the Ortho hypothetical).
83. Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001).
84. AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 230 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (altera-
tion in original) (quoting III PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
652 (rev. ed. 1996)).
85. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
86. William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 929 (2010); see also
Daniel Crane, Reflections on Section 5 of the FTC Act and the FTC's Case Against Intel, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON. Feb. 2010, at 3, https://www.competitionpolicyintemational.con
reflections-on-section-5-of-the-ftc-act-the-ftc-s-case-against-intel/ ("The Commission's pow-
ers under Section 5 are at least co-extensive with the substantive reach of the Sherman Act....
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Until recently, "the Commission ha[d] not pursued free-standing unfair
method of competition claims outside of the most well-accepted areas."87
However, the Commission has "seen an increasing amount of potentially
anticompetitive conduct that is not easily reached under [§ 2] s"' In response,
the FTC has demonstrated a willingness to assert its § 5 mandate beyond
conduct traditionally encompassed by the Sherman Act.8 9 For instance, the
FTC recently settled a case with Intel, in which it alleged that Intel had fallen
behind Advanced Micro Devices in the race for technological superiority for
microprocessors and had resorted to anticompetitive practices like loyalty
rebates for equipment manufacturers in order to stall competitors. 90 The
conduct did not fall neatly within a classic § 2 theory, but the Commission
was able to extract concessions nonetheless.
9'
According to Commissioner Rosch, § 5 also extends beyond § 2 in that
it authorizes the FTC to protect consumer choice independent of the con-
duct's price effects. 92 That is to say that maintaining variety is an
independent objective of competition law. This goal is not universally ac-
cepted, 93 but it is potentially the most applicable to Google.
B. Application to Google
Google possesses a dominant position in the market for core internet
search and uses its power to direct consumers to Google's other proprietary
But the Supreme Court has also held that the FTC may go further than the Sherman Act and
'stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate those
Acts.'" (quoting FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 348 U.S. 316, 322 (1966))).
87. Statement of Chairman Leibowitz and Comm'r Rosch, Fed. Trade Comm'n, In the
Matter of Intel Corp. (Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter FTC Statement on Intel], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelchairstatement.pdf.
88. Id.
89. See Crane, supra note 86, at 2.
90. Jason Mick, FTC, Intel Reach Settlement; Intel Banned from Anticompetitive Prac-
tices, DAILYTECH (Aug. 4, 2010, 1:45 PM), http://www.dailytech.comIFTC+Intel+Reach+
Settlement+Intel+Banned+From+Anticompetitive+Practices/article19265,htm; see also FTC
Statement on Intel, supra note 87.
91. See Intel Corp., [FTC Complaints and Orders 2010-2011 Transfer Binder] Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 16,483 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Oct. 29, 2010).
92. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Convergence and Comity: Still
Improbable?, Remarks Before the Friends of Europe Roundtable on New Transatlantic Trends
in Competition Policy 7 (June 10, 2010), available at http://ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/
100710transatlanticremarks.pdf ("I have said before that I think Section 5 permits the FTC
(and the FTC alone) to protect consumer choice the way that the EC does."). Rosch cites Lee-
gin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), in support of this
proposition. Id. ("[A]fter the Supreme Court's Leegin decision, injury to consumer choice ...
is now recognized as injury to consumer welfare in the United States. I say that because the
Leegin decision permits consumers to choose between 'no frills' buying from a discounter and
buying at a higher price from a reseller offering... services....").
93. Josh Wright, Against Consumer Choice as an Antitrust Standard (Some Preliminary




services. This conduct violates § 2 of the Sherman Act and, alternatively,
constitutes "unfair competition" under § 5 of the FTC Act.
Google meets the first requirement for finding a § 2 violation: posses-
sion of monopoly power. It processes nearly two-thirds of all internet
queries domestically and, perhaps more importantly given the highly global-
ized nature of internet commerce, more than 92 percent of all queries
around the world.94 Its deep integration with its own mobile operating sys-
tem Android and with Apple's iOS has allowed it to obtain a 97 percent
share of the rapidly growing mobile segment of internet search,95 which is
projected to make up more than half of all web searches by 2014.96
When measured in terms of search advertising revenue-search engines'
primary source of income-Google is just as critical. It earns approximately
82 percent of all search advertising revenue. 97 This is an important consider-
ation in Google's market power because the company operates in a complex
two-sided market.98 The services appear free to consumers but in fact are
funded by advertising on the other side of the market. Like television and
newspaper sponsors, Google's advertisers also buy a service from the com-
pany-exposure on the internet. Google's incredible share of advertising
revenue clearly indicates its indispensability to online search advertisers and
serves as a good proxy for its power over them.
If one uses the number of competitors as a metric of market concentra-
tion, Google is also dominant. It faces significant competition from just two
other search engines-Bing and Yahoo! 99-and really only one considering
that Bing now powers Yahoo!."' Further, Microsoft is hemorrhaging money
94. Top 5 Search Engines from March 2011 to March 2012, STATCOUNTER GLOBAL-
STATS, http://gs.statcounter.com/#search-engine-ww-monthly-201103-201203 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2012).
95. Top 5 Mobile Searches in the U.S. from March 2011 to March 2012, STATCOUNTER
GLOBALSTATS, http://gs.statcounter.com/#mobile-search-engine-ww-monthly-201103-201203
(last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
96. See MORGAN STANLEY, THE MOBILE INTERNET REPORT: RAMPING FASTER THAN
DESKTOP INTERNET, THE MOBILE INTERNET WILL BE BIGGER THAN MOST THINK 1 (2009),
available at http://www.slideshare.net/tcrock08/the-mobile-internet-report-2746871.
97. Greg Sterling, Report: Google Dominates Paid Search, Yahoo-Bing Offers Better
ROI, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Oct. 11, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://searchengineland.com/report-
google-dominates-paid-search-yahoo-bing-offers-better-roi-96488.
98. See Joelle Farchy, The Internet: Culture for Free, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL
ECONOMICS 245, 249 (Ruth Towse ed., 2011).
99. See Miranda Miller, Bing Gains More Ground in Search Engine Market Share,
Yahoo Resumes Downward Slide, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Sept. 14, 2012), http://
searchenginewatch.con/article/2205504/Bing-Gains-More-Ground-in-SearchEngine-Market-
Share-Yahoo-Resumes-Downward-Slide.
100. Yahoo! outsourced its search engine operations to Microsoft in 2009, electing to
focus on providing content instead. See Tom Krazit, Breaking Down Microsoft and Yahoo's




on Bing, l0 l which suggests that the continued viability of even this limited
competition is hardly a foregone conclusion. The barriers to entry are in-
credibly high,'0 2 which means that if existing competitors fold, none are
likely to rise up to challenge Google in the future. Former Assistant Attor-
ney General of the DOJ's Antitrust Division Tom Barnett agreed:
If you have an 80 percent share of the market with barriers to entry, you
have monopoly power.
Those barriers don't come from the supposed cost of switching or clicking
to another site. The barriers come from building an effective search engine.
You need the scale, the volume of traffic that Google has to tune the en-
gine, and it's an ongoing process. Nobody else is going to catch Google,
even if you had access to their algorithm today. They have market power."3
Even Google's own chairman and former chief executive, Eric Schmidt,
has acknowledged the extent of Google's market power. When Senator Herb
Kohl asked Schmidt during a Senate antitrust subcommittee hearing in
September 2011 whether Google is a monopolist in online search, Mr.
Schmidt replied, "I would agree, Senator, that we're in that area.""
By guiding users to Google's own content regardless of whether a com-
petitor's content might be more relevant, Google meets the second
requirement for a § 2 violation: anticompetitive conduct. To be sure, Google
has not always done this. At the time of its IPO in 2004, Google was simply
an internet search provider and featured little content of its own.'0 5
101. According to financial records, Microsoft is losing nearly a billion dollars every
quarter on its search engine. David Goldman, Microsoft's Plan to Stop Bing's $1 Billion
Bleeding, CNNMONEY (Sept. 20, 2011, 12:41 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/20/
technology/microsoftbing/index.htm.
102. "Managing search at our scale is a very serious barrier to entry," according to
Google's CEO Eric E. Schmidt. John Markoff & G. Pascal Zachary, In Searching the
Web, Google Finds Riches, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, § 3, at 1, http://
www.nytimes.com/2003/04/13/business/in-searching-the-web-google-finds-riches.html (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
103. Google Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 5, at 33 (statement of
Thomas 0. Barnett, Partner, Covington & Burling, LLP). It should be noted that Barnett, like
Edelman, has connections to Microsoft. See Stephen Labaton, Microsoft Finds Legal Defender
in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, at Al, http://www.nytimes.com2007/
06/10/business/l0microsoft.html.
104. Google Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 5, at 26 (statement of
Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman, Google Inc.); see also Letter from Herb Kohl, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights, and Mike Lee, Ranking
Member, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights, to Jonathan D.
Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n 1 (Dec. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Letter to FTC
Chairman Leibowitz], available at http://kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/upload/Google-FTC-
Letter- 12-19-11 .pdf.
105. See Letter to FTC Chairman Leibowitz, supra note 104, at 2. Larry Page explained
in an interview that "[m]ost portals show their own content above content elsewhere on the
web. We feel that's a conflict of interest, analogous to taking money for search results"




Since then, Google's business model has changed significantly. The
company now features a wide variety of proprietary content both developed
internally and acquired elsewhere, including Google Finance, Google Maps,
Google News, Google Travel, Google Flight Search, Google Places, Google
Plus, Google Product Search, YouTube, and Zagat.10 6 These services perform
specialized functions not interchangeable with Google's core search func-
tion and therefore exist in separate product markets. 107
The services, many of them commonly known as "vertical search"
sites,"°8 generally face much stiffer competition in their respective markets
than Google does in core search. Google Finance competes with Yahoo!
Finance, Google Maps with MapQuest and Bing Maps, and Google Flight
Search with Expedia, Travelocity, Priceline, Orbitz, and a host of others. 09
Yet because Google stood to profit more by keeping users on its own sites
than sending them away, it began to engage in the same practices its found-
ers once ridiculed. 10
Despite the fact that Google represents itself to users as an unbiased
search engine that ranks results purely based on relevance, Il Google
executives have admitted otherwise. Marissa Mayer, a former Google vice
president, explained in a 2007 speech that, in the past, Google ranked links in
the following manner:
Based on ... popularity ... when we roll[ed] out Google Finance, we did
put the Google link first. It seems only fair, right? We do all the work for
the search page and all these other things, so we do put it first .... And af-
ter that it's ranked usually by popularity. 112
Ten years ago, some might have been inclined to agree with Ms. May-
er's notion of fairness. For a search engine as powerful as Google, however,
106. Letter to FTC Chairman Leibowitz, supra note 104, at 2.
107. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) ("In
considering what is the relevant market for determining the control of price and competition,
no more definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by
consumers for the same purposes make up that 'part of the trade or commerce ... ').
108. Vertical Search Engine-Technical Definition, YOURDICTIONARY, http://
computer.yourdictionary.com/vertical-search-engine (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
109. See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Google Roils Travel: Flight Searches, Which Place Google at
Top, Anger Web Rivals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2011, at Al, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052970203686204577116700668483194.html; Fifteen Most Popular
Business Websites, supra note 52; Google Traffic Report, supra note 46, at 6.
110. See supra text accompanying note 45; supra note 105.
111. Eric Schmidt insisted during the September 2011 hearing before the Senate antitrust
subcommittee that Google does not "cook[]" its results to favor its own products. See Diane
Bartz & Malathi Nayak, Schmidt Says Google Has Not Cooked Search Results, REUTERS,
Sept. 21, 2011, available at http:/lwww.reuters.comlarticlel2Ol 1/09/21/us-google-hearing-
idUSTRE78K41Y20110921.
112. GoogleTalksArchive, Seattle Conference on Scalability: Scaling Google for Every
User, YouTUBE, at 44:33 (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Syc3axgRsBw
(presentation by Marissa Mayer, Vice President of Search Products and User Experience,
Google Inc., on June 23, 2007).
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the practice is highly problematic. This is because, as discussed in Section
I.B, consumers are increasingly reliant on search engines to navigate the
ever-growing internet. Over 90 percent of consumers use search engines to
navigate the more than one trillion existing web pages, and 88 percent of
them click on one of the first three links in a set of results."13 Google's own
sites, rather than the most relevant sites, commonly occupy the most valua-
ble real estate on a results page. ' 14 By elevating its own content to the top of
its results without necessarily "earning" that position based on the algo-
rithm, Google generates traffic for its own services (and enjoys the resulting
advertising revenue on those pages) while simultaneously depriving its
competitors of that traffic.
Thus, competition between Google search verticals and its competitors
is no longer based solely on the merits of the products that the companies
have built. Google has created a built-in advantage for its vertical search
services based on superior exposure, and it's an advantage no other compa-
ny can match. "I A competitor who develops a superior shopping
comparison service, for instance, must still rely on searchers to look beyond
Google's "higher ranked" Product Search service to win business. The com-
petitor's handicap is further magnified in the maps market, where the
Google Map appears at the top of the results page but the competing map
requires at least a click-through and likely more data entry on a new page.
This type of conduct, where Google owes the success of its search verticals
not to "superior product, business acumen, or historic accident""'6 but to the
mere fact that they are subsidiaries of "the biggest kingmaker on this
Earth,"' 17 is anticompetitive.
The notion that biased search constitutes anticompetitive conduct is
hardly revolutionary. There is highly analogous precedent for such a finding
in the government's investigation of airline customer reservation services
("CRSs") in the 1980s. CRS software, which allowed travel agents to search
for flights, was often owned by individual airlines and displayed that airline's
flights first, even if other carriers offered lower prices or nonstop service." 8
113. Letter to FTC Chairman Leibowitz, supra note 104, at 1, 3 (citing KRISTIN PUR-
CELL, PEw RESEARCH CTR., SEARCH AND EMAIL STILL TOP THE LIST OF MOST POPULAR
ONLINE ACTIVITIES 2 (2011), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/-/Media/Files/Reports/
2011/PIPSearch-and-Email.pdf, and Google Ranking and CTR How Clicks Distribute over
Different Rankings on Google, SEO SCIENTIST (July 12, 2009, 11:17 AM), http://www.seo-
scientist.com/google-ranking-ctr-click-distribution-over-serps.html).
114. For examples of how Google reserves prime visual space for its own services in a
variety of search queries, see Gateway to Gatekeeper, supra note 53, at 19-31.
115. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text for examples of industries that
Google has been able to leverage itself into via its search dominance.
116. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
117. Matt Warman, Google, Caffeine and the Future of Search, TELEGRAPH, June
17, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/7833590/Google-Caffeine-and-
the-future-of-search.html.
118. Benjamin Edelman, Remedies for Search Bias, BENEDELMAN.ORG (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.benedelman.org/news/022211-I.html; see also Reply Comments of the Depart-
ment of Justice at 7, Computer Reservation System Regulations (Dep't of Transp. 2003) (No.
March 20131
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Despite the fact that the travel agents were free to use a different CRS or run
more searches to find other flights,"I9 the Department of Transportation
promulgated rules prohibiting the CRSs from ordering flights based on any
factor related to carrier identity. 2 '
The same principle applies here: Google ought not to rank results by any
metric that distinctively favors Google. The consequences of doing so could
be very harmful to competition and, in turn, consumers. For instance, com-
panies like Yelp! and Nextag, which rely on Google to drive 75 and 65
percent of their traffic respectively, might not remain viable if they lose this
traffic to Google's proprietary offerings. '2
Admittedly, antitrust law exists to protect competition, not individual
competitors. 122 Nevertheless, these firms would likely "have to spend much
more on advertising to make up for lost traffic coming from Google que-
ries," 2  which is money they could otherwise put toward product
development or other productive uses. Moreover, Google's favoritism could
threaten innovation generally. It is easy to see how an inventor could be de-
terred from investing his blood, sweat, and tears into his idea for a product
with the looming threat of Google usurping it soon after. Indeed, the CEOs
of both Nextag and Yelp! testified before the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee
that neither would attempt to launch their companies today in light of
Google's current business practices. 24 Google's anticompetitive conduct has
a chilling effect on competition that could resonate throughout future gener-
ations of the internet.
Google's practices will result in an internet with fewer choices for con-
sumers and businesses, higher prices, and less innovation.'25 Obviously, for
a sector of our economy that boasts 240 million domestic users and $170
billion in annual commerce, this is highly undesirable. 2 6 Unfortunately,
since the FTC abandoned its investigation, a direct settlement with the gov-
ernment in the near-term is unlikely. But the issue remains far from dead. A
OST-97-2281), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/201081.htm ("In
airline markets, the CRSs were able to bias information displays to give greater prominence to
their affiliated airline flights and to suppress information on competitors' flights. The CRSs
found that even small changes in display prominence could have significant effects in divert-
ing passengers to their flights from competitors.").
119. Edelman, supra note 118.
120. 14 C.F.R. § 225.4 (2012).
121. Letter to FTC Chairman Leibowitz, supra note 104, at 3 (citing Google Senate
Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 5 (statements of Jeremy Stoppelman, CEO of
Yelp!, and Jeremy Katz, CEO of Nextag)).
122. U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, supra note 65, at 11-12.
123. Letter to FTC Chairman Leibowitz, supra note 104, at 3 (citing Google Senate
Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 5 (statements of Jeremy Stoppelman, CEO of
Yelp!, and Jeremy Katz, CEO of Nextag)).
124. Id. at 3-4.
125. Google Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 5, at 191-92 (statement
of Thomas 0. Barnett, Partner, Covington & Burling, LLP).
126. Id. at 181-82.
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court could still impose a remedy through an injunction in a private lawsuit
brought by Google's vertical competitors. And the FTC or the DOJ can al-
ways reopen the investigation at a later date as competitive harms become
more readily observable, as this Note anticipates. Part III of this Note pro-
poses a remedy that will mitigate the anticompetitive effects of Google's
favoritism.
III. A FAMILIAR SOLUTION
This Part argues that the optimal solution to remedy the antitrust viola-
tions set forth in Part II is for Google to publish its Application
Programming Interfaces ("APIs"). Other search verticals could then com-
pete with Google on the merits of their services by integrating into Google
core search. This type of solution, first mentioned by Edelman,'27 finds
precedent in Microsoft's antitrust settlement over browser interoperability.
In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the government accused the soft-
ware giant Microsoft of bundling its dominant operating system Windows
with its web browser Internet Explorer, which had been competing primarily
with Netscape.12 8 In order to prevent Netscape from gaining a foothold in
the market for browsers, Microsoft entered into a number of agreements
with original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") to install Internet Explor-
er in a prominent location on the desktop while either relegating Netscape's
browser to a less conspicuous location or excluding it altogether.12 9 The
government also accused Microsoft of using the Windows source code to
advantage Microsoft's other offerings by allowing those offerings to access
features that third-party software could not. 3 " The government alleged this
was an instance of anticompetitive tying, as Microsoft was leveraging its
position as a monopolist in the market for operating systems to advantage its
other software in competitive markets.'
Microsoft's market power in operating systems was almost indisputable.
Windows was installed on nearly nineteen out of every twenty Intel-based
PCs and its market share was well fortified. 32 In order for consumers to
switch operating systems, they needed to spend hundreds, if not thousands,
of dollars on new software or equipment, as well as put in the requisite time
to learn how to operate the new system. This meant that the barriers to entry
for competitors were enormous given the cost of developing an operating
system and the arduous task of convincing consumers to migrate.
The Department of Justice worried that Microsoft's ability to handicap
competing application developers by limiting their ability to integrate with
127. See Edelman, supra note 17.
128. 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
129. Microsoft Corp., 253 F3d at 60-61.
130. Id. at 64, 67.
131. Id. at 47. For a description of tying as an antitrust violation, see supra Section II.A.
132. Id. at 54.
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Windows would stifle innovation.133 And so, as part of its settlement in
2001, Microsoft signed a consent decree in which it agreed to publish all the
Windows Application Programming Interfaces that its other software
used. 134 This ensured that virtually all programs could integrate with Win-
dows in all the same ways that Microsoft's own products could. It
effectively prevented Microsoft from using its operating system dominance
to steal market share for its other product offerings.
This Note proposes a similar solution for Google. The anticompetitive
threat is Google foreclosing equally or more efficient competitors 13 5 by
advantaging its own offerings on the Google core search platform in a way
that competitors can't possibly match. The solution is to neutralize the ad-
vantage to ensure that an equally efficient competitor can compete. In order
to accomplish this, antitrust authorities should require Google to document
its own APIs and allow competing content providers like search verticals to
develop applications that integrate into a Google core search.
An API is a set of standardized requests that allows software programs
to communicate with each other.'36 Specifically, when APIs are defined for
the host software, they allow other programs to call upon the host program
to "request services" that it would not otherwise be able to duplicate it-
self.'37 "By providing a means for requesting program services, an API is
said to grant access to or open an application."'3 8 It is analogous to "an elec-
trical socket, which allows outside products (in this case, applications) to
plug into the electrical system (in this case, [Google]).' 1 39 With common
plug forms, all devices are able to draw the resources regardless of manufac-
turer.
133. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees, United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (2001) (Nos.
00-5212, 00-5213), 2001 WL 34129769 ("They therefore decided to make technical changes
in Windows to ensure that removing IE from Windows is difficult and that ... running any
other browser is a jolting experience." (internal quotations omitted)).
134. Stipulation & Revised Proposed Final Judgment at § l.1D, Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34 (No. 98-1232), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f9400/9495.htm.
135. The "equally efficient competitor" test is central to a European analysis of this type
of foreclosure. E.g., Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2010 E.C.R.
1-09555. In the United States, it is also used to describe a firm that may be illegitimately
foreclosed by anticompetitive conduct. E.g., POSNER, supra note 14, at 196; Nalebuff, supra
note 82.
136. David Orenstein, QuickStudy: Application Programming Interface (API), COMPUT-
ERWORLD (Jan. 10, 2000, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/43487/
ApplicationProgrammingInterface. Microsoft's settlement with the government provided
the following definition: "'Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)' means the interfaces,
including any associated callback interfaces, that Microsoft Middleware running on a Win-
dows Operating System Product uses to call upon that Windows Operating System Product in
order to obtain any services from that Windows Operating System Product." Stipulation &
Revised Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 134, at § VI.A.
137. Orenstein, supra note 136.
138. Id.




In the Microsoft case, Windows was the host program (operating sys-
tem) with which outside programs (Netscape) needed to communicate in
order to operate. By withholding the operating system API that defined how
a web browser calls upon Windows functionality, Microsoft was able to pro-
tect its own downstream product (Internet Explorer). Here, Google core
search is the equivalent of a host program.140 Google's downstream services
"plug in" to its search functionality, which is how it knows which map to
display when a person searches for a nearby restaurant. Under the status
quo, Google is able to ensure that only its own downstream offerings are
integrated into Google's core search. But what if Google published APIs and
made them accessible to third parties? History tells us that we could very
well see the emergence of a vibrant network of developers building "appli-
cations" on top of Google's core search. In the years after Microsoft agreed
not to restrict its APIs, software like Apple's iTunes has challenged the reign
of Microsoft's Windows Media Player141 while Mozilla Firefox and Google
Chrome have eaten away at Internet Explorer's dominance.1 2 Just as an
open Windows helped drive innovation in software, an open Google could
do something similar on the web.
Today, when a user searches for the name of a nearby restaurant, a
Google Map might appear among the search results. With an open interface,
Google's advanced search algorithm would still determine when an embed-
ded map would be appropriate, but the map would not necessarily be
Google's. For instance, MapQuest could develop a Google application that
would display a MapQuest map on the Google search results page in place
of the Google map. Google would not be required to display the MapQuest
map on its own, but users would be able to select MapQuest as a "preferred
provider" of sorts in their Google account settings. For that user, any search
that would ordinarily yield an embedded Google map would produce an
embedded MapQuest map instead. This would ensure that Google users who
prefer MapQuest maps are not driven to switch to Google Maps merely be-
cause in the long run it requires fewer clicks from a search page. The same
goes for Bing Maps and Yahoo! Maps. If one of them implements a new
feature that distinguishes it from Google Maps and that users find desirable,
it will be able to compete directly on the merits with Google Maps and no
longer have to overcome the inconvenience factor for users who prefer
Google for their core search needs.
140. The technical language is not exact, as Google and Windows are very distinct types
of programs. Chiefly, Windows is conventional software that installs and operates on a PC,
while Google is more of a "service" that operates over the internet. However, their roles are
analogous.
141. See Apple iTunes Penetration Closing Gap with Microsoft-April 2011 Bandwidth
Report, WEBSITEOPTIMIZATION.COM (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.websiteoptimization.com/
bw/ 1104/.
142. Garry Przyklenk, Browser Wars: How Chrome Overtook Firefox for the First Time,




One can imagine how an open Google could lead to fierce competition
in the downstream markets and, in turn, a thriving network of preferred pro-
viders. Of these, consumers could customize their favorite offerings for a
variety of categories of downstream services. For instance, today a Google
search for "flights to Cancun" might yield results from Google Travel,
Google Flight Search, and Google Places all on one page. In the future,
however, the same search could yield flights from Expedia, hotel reviews
from Priceline, and Cancun restaurant reviews from Yelp!. If Google pub-
lishes the best vertical offerings, then few users will switch vertical search
providers and Google will be rewarded with the bulk of the vertical search
traffic.
This solution also incorporates aspects of Microsoft's 2009 settlement
with the European Commission regarding abuse of its dominance in the
market for web browsers. In that case, the European Commission alleged
that Microsoft "distort[ed] competition on the merits between competing
web browsers insofar as it provide[d] Internet Explorer with an artificial
distribution advantage" over competitors. 43 The terms of the settlement
called for Windows to present users with a list of browsers in random order,
including Internet Explorer, to choose from.'" By requiring users to make
an active choice, the tie between Internet Explorer and Windows was cut.
145
My proposal, similarly, would present users with the option of choosing
their favorite map publisher, travel metasearch, shopping site, et cetera.
Unlike the EU Microsoft model, the selection screen in my proposal
would not be limited to the most popular offerings arranged in a randomized
order, the approach suggested by Edelman. 14 Instead, it would display all
qualified applications for that API. This avoids the hypocrisy of punishing
Google for stunting competition in downstream markets only to "lock in"
market share for an oligopoly of players in that same market. It also main-
tains enough flexibility to accommodate asymmetrical consumer
preferences. For example, while users in Detroit will have the Detroit Free
Press among their favorite newspaper providers, they are unlikely to be very
interested in the San Francisco Chronicle and vice versa. In the market for
news applications, a comprehensive list will ensure that everyone receives
the benefits of integrated search instead of only those who share the most
common tastes.
143. Press Release, European Conmm'n, Antitrust: Commission Confirms Sending a
Statement of Objections to Microsoft on the Tying of Internet Explorer to Windows (Jan. 17,
2009) (emphasis added), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/09/15.
144. Matthew Bennett et al., What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition
Policy?, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 111, 130. The five most popular browsers
by market share were displayed prominently, but users could access up to seven other choices
by scrolling sideways. Nicholas Economides & loannis Lianos, A Critical Appraisal of Reme-
dies in the E.U. Microsoft Cases, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 346, 394-95.
145. Bennett et al., supra note 144, at 130.
146. See Edelman, supra note 17, at 29-30.
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The solution I put forth offers several other advantages compared to
Edelman's as well. Unlike the browsers in Europe, the options here would
be ordered alphabetically instead of randomly to ensure that users could
easily locate their preferred provider. The alternative-theoretically unlim-
ited applications in randomized order-could be so chaotic for consumers
that it would diminish their added utility from this system and could poten-
tially deter use of the system entirely. 147 Further, the selection mechanism
would not be an intrusive pop-up like the browser selection process as
Edelman suggests, but rather would be accessed through a user's account
settings.
The subtle selection process is actually a very important component of in-
tegrating vertical providers in order to avoid compromising the user's
experience of the Google platform itself. Under Edelman's more extreme pro-
posal, a user who does not actively make the selections will presumably
receive no vertical search results-only options for providers--every time he
runs a search without logging in first (as he might if searching from a differ-
ent computer, for instance). 48 This could actually drive users from Google's
core search altogether and sap public support for intervention. With a pas-
sive selection process it is fair to assume that fewer users will actively
switch providers, but as long as the option is available to them it is difficult
to say that the competition is unfair.
Some critics dismiss vertical search interoperability as unduly intru-
sive.149 They compare it to the integrated, multifunctional iPhone and
conclude that it would be ridiculous to "require these innovators to re-
engineer their devices so that iPhone users can swap in a Canon or Sony
camera instead of Apple's chosen camera, or swap in a Zune or Rio music
player instead of Apple's iPod."' 150 This analogy, however, is disingenuous.
One reason my plan is desirable is because it would probably not be cost
prohibitive for Google. Indeed, the leading antitrust scholars explain that the
Microsoft court was sensitive to the low cost of publishing APIs.'5' That we
have yet to see a cell phone with a swappable camera, but can find embed-
ded third-party content virtually everywhere on the internet,152 illustrates
how far-fetched the analogy is. Microsoft is a far better analogy.
An important qualification to ensure minimal intrusiveness is that
Google would only be required to publish the "external" APIs of its core
search (which allow it to communicate with other programs) and not
147. Assuming the downstream markets develop like this Note anticipates, there could
be literally hundreds of offerings for applications like news.
148. See Edelman, supra note 17, at 29-30.
149. See Marvin Ammori & Luke Pelican, Competitors' Proposed Remedies for Search
Bias: Search "Neutrality" and Other Proposals, J. INTERNET L., May 2012, at 1, 17-18.
150. Id. at 18.
151. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
§ 17-140 (2011) ("An API is nothing more than a few lines of computer code. These could
readily be included in software development kits or even placed in a separate file ... ").
152. Edelman highlights examples like embedded AdSense ads and YouTube videos
among other widgets. See Edelman, supra note 17, at 30.
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"internal" ones (which are used exclusively by the core search service
itself). 5 3 This was an important distinction Microsoft drew in its own
consent decree 54 and it would ensure that the remedy doesn't burden
Google's innovation in core search itself. Google should also be permitted
to maintain reasonable prohibitions on what sorts of programs can integrate
with the core service in order to maintain its high-quality user experience.
For instance, programs that compromise user or server security or run afoul
of Google's privacy policy could be blocked.
55
The remedy would theoretically be limited in duration, as is typical in
antitrust cases. 5 6 A fixed time limit is not ideal in this case, however, since
Google's importance to the development of the internet is more likely to
increase than decrease over time. 57 Instead, the remedy could theoretically
be conditioned on other factors. 58 For instance, if Google's share of core
search were to fall below a certain threshold in the future (50 percent, for
example), the requirements could sunset automatically. 1 9 Or if technology
changes in such a way that Google is no longer critical to online exposure,
the company could seek to terminate the interoperability rules.
6
1
Such a system would maximize consumer welfare during each search (in
the short run) by showing users the results from all of their most trusted
search verticals, all without compromising the convenience of the current
integrated, "universal search" format. More importantly, it would maximize
consumer welfare in the long run by ensuring that Google has to compete
with other search verticals on the merits of their offerings in order to earn
consumers' business. Thus, competition, and in turn innovation, will thrive.
Ultimately, antitrust law in the United States is most concerned with the
consumer. 6 ' This remedy would take an important step toward protecting
consumers far into the future, no matter how the internet may develop going
forward.
153. See Bowman, supra note 139.
154. Id.
155. Microsoft secured a similar compromise in its deal with the Department of Justice.
See Stipulation & Revised Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 134, at § III.J.1 (providing
that the Final Judgment would not "[r]equire Microsoft to ... license to third parties: (a) por-
tions of APIs ... [that] would compromise the security of a particular installation or group of
installations of anti-piracy, anti-virus, software licensing, digital rights management, encryp-
tion or authentication systems.").
156. Stephen Calkins, Civil Monetary Remedies Available to Federal Antitrust Enforc-
ers, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 567, 569 (2006).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
158. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 155, at 728-29.
159. See id. at 728.
160. See id.
161. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, 'Obvious'Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy:
The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School and the Courts, in POsT-CHICAGO DEVELOP-
MENTS IN ANTITRUST LAw 129, 132 (Antonio Cucinotta et al. eds., 2002).
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IV. RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS
This Part responds to three separate counterarguments put forth by op-
ponents of neutral search. In response to the claim that competing sites are
just "one click away" 162 Section IV.A asserts that users are unlikely to be
aware of superior content and that the two-sided structure of the search mar-
ket means Google's advertising customers will still suffer. Section IV.B
refutes the claim that Google is only one entity and thus is not "leveraging"
its power in an anticompetitive way. Finally, Section IV.C responds to critics
who question the wisdom of governmental meddling in such a dynamic in-
dustry by establishing that my solution will not detract from Google's
incentive to innovate.
A. "Just One Click Away"
Many critics of search neutrality attack the very notion that Google has
monopoly power. The key refrain, initiated by Google and endorsed by
many commentators, is that regardless of its market share, Google can't
possibly have monopoly power because competing products are "just one
click away." For its search engine, this means that if Google's core search
gives a lackluster performance, Bing and Yahoo! are easily accessible to
users seeking more relevant results. For its search verticals like Google
Maps, there are no obstacles to an unsatisfied user typing MapQuest's web-
site into his browser's address bar. Unlike Microsoft's Windows, which
could not easily be abandoned by an unsatisfied user, Google's audience is
not captive.
Geoffrey Manne, one of the most outspoken opponents of search neu-
trality,163 asserts that there is no single, correct way to ascertain a website's
relevance, stating that "[r]elevance is a slippery and subjective concept, dif-
ferent for every user and every query, and there is no a priori way to define
it.' ' 66 He is correct. Google helps us differentiate between websites, which is
exactly why we use a search engine in the first place. If Google did not dis-
criminate, the search engine would be nothing more than a phone book for the
162. Google Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 5, at 232 (statement of
Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman, Google Inc.) ("[O]ur product innovation and engineering
talent deliver results that we believe users like, in a world where the competition is only one
click away."); Facts About Google and Competition: Questions and Answers, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.comI/competition/qa.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) ("Does Google have a
monopoly in search? No. On the Internet, competition is one click away. Users aren't locked
in to using Google search, and the cost of switching to a different search engine is zero.").
163. His advocacy comes at a cost, however. Manne discloses on his website, Truth on
the Market, that he receives grants from the International Center for Law and Economics,
which accepts funding from Google. Disclosures, TRUTH ON THE MARKET, http://
truthonthemarket.com/disclosures/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
164. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, IfSearch Neutrality Is the Answer What's




internet. 165 Thus, the extent to which a user agrees with Google's rankings is
precisely what gives Google its value, and if users disagree with Google's
determination, Bing and Yahoo! are "one click away." For this reason, Manne
concludes that regulation is unnecessary because the market dictates that
Google will regulate itself. Since Google's utility to users and, in turn, its
attractiveness to advertisers depend on a high level of relevance, it under-
mines Google's profitability to show less relevant sites first.
66
However, the "one click away" argument overlooks some significant
points. First, it presumes that each user has a predefined conception of
relevance. In reality, it seems much more likely that a user's conception of
relevance is influenced by the search results. Most people are likely to
believe that the first listing they see is the most relevant listing. Therefore,
instead of switching to Bing or Yahoo! if the results do not appear in the
order the user expects, the user simply modifies his perception of the web-
site's relevance. Daniel Crane admits, "Empirical work shows that users
place a large degree of trust in Google's perceived neutrality in ranking
relevance to queries, often substituting Google's algorithmic judgment of
relevance for their own evaluation of search result abstracts."'167 Bracha
and Pasquale similarly conclude that manipulation is not likely to correlate
with user defection. 68 In fact, this entire argument depends on the highly
questionable assumption that consumers even have the ability to detect the
manipulation. 69 A search engine as readily embraced as Google would like-
ly need to establish a long pattern of highly irrelevant results to lose the
esteem of its users.
Second, the "one click away" argument ignores the fact that Google's
customers are not only internet users but also advertisers. Advertising is
Google's primary revenue stream. This makes advertisers some of its most
important customers and they are anything but "one click away."'7° If adver-
tisers want to maintain a visible online presence, they are beholden to
Google. If Google shuts out competing search verticals (whose ad space
competes with Google's), it could become the exclusive outlet for online
advertising in sectors like online maps and travel search. The diminished
competition would lead to higher prices for this often overlooked group of
customers.171
165. Id. at 32 (citing James Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, in
THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE 435, 442-43 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010)).
166. See id. at 16, 19-20.
167. Daniel A. Crane, Search Neutrality and Referral Dominance, 8 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 459, 467 (2012) (citing Bing Pan et al., In Google We Trust: Users' Decisions on
Rank, Position, and Relevance, 12 J. COMPUTER MEDIATED COMM. 801 (2007)).
168. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1179.
169. See id. at 1178-79.
170. Don't Believe Everything You Hear: A Guide to the Google Speak (Updated),





As a result, it matters little whether Google's customers are truly captive
in the same way Microsoft's users were, and it would be a mistake to focus
on that aspect of the analogy. Instead, the key focus should be on Google's
ability to lock out its competition, rather than lock in its users. Google may
not be able to prevent its users from accessing its competitors' offerings, but
it can actively steer them toward its own. Consumers may prefer features of
a competitor's service, but that may not be enough to overcome the conven-
ience of Google's service integrated into their main internet portal. And for
sites still working toward achieving widespread familiarity with the public
but that require exposure to do so, Google's favoritism may forever relegate
upstarts to the internet's B-list regardless of their quality.
With search engine exposure likely to become even more critical to suc-
cess in the future, the risk of the above scenario coming true is high. And in
turn, the incentive to invest in a great idea is diminished. Perhaps the "next"
Google-a highly successful business that earned its popularity through
cutting-edge innovation and an even online playing field-would fail to ma-
terialize. This is bad for consumers in the long run, regardless of how many
"clicks away" competitors are today. They would be better off, both in the
long run and short run, if competing search verticals were available no
clicks away, as described in the solution in Part III.
B. One Service
The second assertion Google's defenders make is that Google Maps,
Google Finance, Google Flight Search, and YouTube are not actually sepa-
rate products from Google's core search. 17 2 The future of search, they
contend, is more than just ranking web pages. The industry is moving to-
ward "universal search," where information of all kinds is available through
a single query.173 According to Chairman Schmidt, "the question of whether
we 'favor' our 'products and services' is based on an inaccurate premise.
These universal search results are our search service-they are not some
separate 'Google content' that can be 'favored.' ",174 To illustrate, when a
consumer searches for Outback Steakhouse, he does not just want to see a
list of websites related to his favorite purveyor of Australian cuisine. In-
stead, he wants to see the restaurant's website listed next to a map
featuring all the nearest locations, with user-written restaurant reviews for
each. Likewise, he wants a search for "trip to Ann Arbor" to give him
flight options, local hotel information, and Zagat's recommendations for the
best local brewery.
172. Matt McGee, Eric Schmidt Tells Congress that Google Doesn't Have 'Separate
Products & Services', SEARCHENGINELAND (Nov. 4, 2011, 8:01 PM), http://
searchengineland.com/eric-schmidt-reply-congress-antitrust- 100070.
173. See id; Danny Sullivan, Google 2.0: Google Universal Search, SEARCH ENGINE
LAND (May 16, 2007), http://searchengineland.com/google-20-google-universal-search-
11232.
174. Sullivan, supra note 173 (emphasis added).
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Search is moving away from the "ten blue links" display.' 75 Given the
progression toward universal search, Google's defenders contend that
Google's conduct is not anticompetitive with respect to search verticals
and content providers. Rather, it is procompetitive with respect to Google's
core-search competitors like Bing and Yahoo!, which integrate their own
proprietary offerings just like Google.
176
If we accept Google's contention that all its services are merely compo-
nents of one Google search, it becomes difficult to make the claim that Google
is leveraging its power in one market to drive out competitors in other mar-
kets. Yet the idea of a single, integrated product market defies conventional
notions of product markets, which require "reasonable interchangeability"
between the competing products. 77 For example, if a user is unsatisfied with
the results for "pet food" on Google's core search, does Google really ex-
pect her to switch to... Travelocity?
Commentators also disagree with the characterization of Google's
portfolio of services as a unitary product.'78 Even the company contradicts
this characterization by publishing an extensive list of "products" on its
website. 79 Thus, the unitary product contention ultimately appears to be a
disingenuous decoy argument over semantics.
Further, acceptance of Google's perspective could have disastrous
effects for consumer choice in the internet ecosystem of the future. In
Schmidt's eyes, Google seems to be competing with only Bing and Yahoo!
to determine who can amass the strongest network of content and vertical
search services that consumers want to use for all their information needs. 80
175. Daniel A. Crane, Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle, 19 GEo. MASON L.
REV. 1199, 1203 (2012).
176. Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does the Chicago School Teach About
Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
(forthcoming 2012) ("Displaying specialized search results in a general search results page is an
integral step to improving search for consumers. Microsoft launched Bing with this exact
intention-specifically, 'to build on the benefits of today's search engines but ... move beyond
this experience with a new approach to user experience and intuitive tools to help customers
make better decisions .... '"), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2012/10/05/-what-does-the-
chicago-school-teach-about-internet-search-and-the-antitrust-treatment-f-google- 132249480
630.pdf.
177. See I ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 154, at 573.
178. Fact-Checking Google: Schmidt's Answers Underscore Question, Is "Trust
Us" Enough to Settle Antitrust Concerns, FAIRSEARCH (Nov. 8, 2011), http://
www.fairsearch.org/general/fact-checking-google-schmidts-answers-underscore-questidon-is-
trust-us-enough-to-settle-antitrust-concerns/.
179. See About Google: Products, Google, http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/
products/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2012). This list is described as a "comprehensive list of all our
products" in the "Frequently Asked Questions" page for investors. Investor Relations: Fre-
quently Asked Questions, Google, http://investor.google.com/corporate/faq.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2012).
180. See McGee, supra note 172; see also Bork & Sidik, supra note 176, at 9 ("Indeed,
Bing, Yahoo, and Ask.com all produce general search results pages that also include special-
ized search results grouped together near the top or middle of the first results page. Therefore,
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Since other third-party verticals are not really "competing," they are merely
collateral damage in a war of attrition between the search giants. Left
unrestrained, it is not hard to see Google leading us into a world where
maps, travel, video, shopping, and possibly even news are all found
primarily through the "universal" networks of the major search providers. If
you want a map, search Google. If you aren't happy with Google, try Bing.
Sure, competing products will still be "one click away," but there very well
may be only one competitor for any product offering. And it would likely
never change, since the massive scale and capital required to compete in
universal search would make new entry impossible. 81 The "open intemet"
dream would die.
This is admittedly a somewhat extreme, apocalyptic prophecy for open
internet, but the risk of diminished content diversity on the web is very
real. Universal search is undoubtedly a good thing for consumers. But it
would be shortsighted to excuse Google from fair competition with ser-
vices it admittedly competes with'12 simply because it happens to compete
with bigger fish too.
Finally, Google's ambition in universal search is easily reconcilable
with the proposal in Part III to make it compete fairly with vertical search
services. The proposal simply calls for Google to allow competing search
verticals to integrate into its core search in the same way Google's own
offerings can. Google could still provide a truly universal search experi-
ence. The only difference is that the content could come from sources
other than Google if the consumer so desired. In fact, if Google's endgame
really is the market for universal search, implementing such a system
might even be in its best interest. Consumers would love it, and Bing and
Yahoo! would need to work diligently to catch up.
C. Don't Stifle a Dynamic Industry
Finally, critics of search neutrality contend that, even if Google has
monopoly power and even if it is using that power in a way that seems
anticompetitive on the surface, we should not attempt to apply traditional
antitrust principles to an industry as rapidly changing as the search
it is reasonable to infer that this display has "competitive virtues"-it reflects consumer pref-
erences.").
181. See Google Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 5, at 33, 54, 192
(statement of Thomas 0. Barnett, Former Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
182. During his hearing before the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, Eric Schmidt testified
to the following:
[W]e find that the monthly general search query figures released by comScore and Hit-
wise don't reflect the reality of how many sites Google competes with in search. Google
has many competitors that are not general search engines, including specialized search
engines, social networks, and mobile apps. So inferring that Google is in any way "dom-
inant" in search would be incorrect.
McGee, supra note 172.
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industry. 183 Google may be an empire today but it did not even have a
registered domain name a little more than fifteen years ago. 184 In another
fifteen, who knows what the landscape of the web will look like. We
should not assume that just because Google dominates search today, it will
dominate other forms of content in the future. After all, people shared the
same concerns about lost diversity of content when America Online
("AOL") was set to merge with Time Warner in 2000.185 Less than a
decade later, the media dominance failed to materialize, the marriage is
over, and AOL has been relegated to a skeleton of its former self.186
In the same vein, search-neutrality critics argue that in such a dynamic
sector, government intervention to protect innovation might actually end
up impeding it. Crane would attribute this to heavy-handed government
regulation, as oversight over the "thousands of complex decisions" that
Google makes each day would require "an army of bureaucrats ... dwarf-
ing the one mandated by the Microsoft consent decree.
'187
Manne's camp views the problem slightly differently. Google itself is a
great innovator, it argues, and has proven so time and again.188 Manne be-
lieves that Google will continue to innovate, but neutrality rules that
would limit its potential advertising revenue (by preventing it from direct-
ing consumers to its sites) and put its source code at risk (by requiring it to
publish its algorithm) would serve to reduce Google's incentive to inno-
vate. 1
89
These arguments all have merit. However, they are not compelling
enough to warrant abandoning our long-established reverence for competi-
183. See generally POSNER, supra note 14, ch. 8 (explaining his skepticism about the
harms of single-firm exclusionary practices in the "new economy," which includes software
development and online services). Some commentators also advocate taking care not to revert
to a pre-Chicago School era of antitrust enforcement where dominant firms seemed to be
punished for their legitimate business success. See WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA,
THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 14-22
(2007).
184. See WHOIS/IPWHOIS Lookup Results for Google.com, DNSSTUFF: http://
www.dnsstuff.com/tools#whois/type=domain&&value=google.com (last visited Oct. 11,
2012).
185. Victor Navasky, AOL-Time Warner Merger: Is Big Really Bad? Well, Yes, TIME,
Jan. 24, 2000, at 44, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,995894,00.html.
186. AOL-Time Warner Split Complete, Fox NEWS (Dec. 10, 2009), http://
www.foxnews.com/us/2009/12/1 0/aol-time-wamer-split-complete/.
187. Crane, supra note 175, at 1208; see also POSNER, supra note 14, at 251 (discussing
"both the difficulty of squashing competition by [unilateral firm conduct] and the danger that
heavy-handed antitrust enforcement may suppress a practice that seems anticompetitive but
actually is efficient").
188. See Manne & Wright, supra note 164, at 18.
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tion, especially given the manageable requirements of my solution. First,
although we admittedly cannot foretell exactly how far Google's dominion
will reach, that is not a good reason to overlook the risk. Just because
AOL's widespread dominance failed to materialize does not mean
Google's will too, particularly because Google has a substantial amount of
control over how the internet develops going forward.
Second, the burdensome regulatory regime that Crane anticipates will
not arise under my proposed solution. Unlike Edelman's solution, which
calls for a blanket general prohibition on favoritism, an army of technical
bureaucrats would not be necessary. This is because Google would only
have to publish enough of its protocols to allow competing search verticals
to plug into Google's core search. The industry would therefore regulate
itself, as competitors would monitor compliance. If Google does not engage
in any foul play, it would likely be able to make its "thousands of complex
decisions about the ordering of search results"'1 90 unimpeded.
And while Manne is correct to note that Google has been one of the in-
ternet's preeminent innovators, its accomplishments do not afford it
special treatment under antitrust law. Google's incentive to continue inno-
vating would not be diminished under the proposal in Part III because if it
stagnated in vertical search, competitors' offerings would steal its market
share. Likewise, if it failed to continue innovating in core search, it would
lose market share to Bing and Yahoo!. In fact, Google's motivation would
likely be greater than ever because if it wanted to continue to earn adver-
tising revenue from its search verticals, it would have to rely on the merits
of its products instead of an artificial distributional advantage. Manne's
contention that forced publication of its algorithm would discourage
Google from investing in core search is probably true, but not relevant in
this case because this Note does not advocate such publication.
CONCLUSION
Since its inception in the late 1990s, Google has done as much as any
company to create an "open internet" with its impressive innovation and
its advocacy on behalf of net neutrality. However, as Google extends its
ambition beyond its core function, the company has begun to threaten the
very openness and diversity it once championed. Senator Richard
Blumenthal likened Google to a racetrack owner. "You run the racetrack,
you own the racetrack," he told Schmidt, and now that Google owns some
of the horses, "you seem to be winning."' 91 In order to mitigate the damage
to competition, Google must be prevented from leveraging its power in
core search to steal market share for its downstream vertical search
services. For now, the FIC has decided to kick the can down the road, but
190. Crane, supra note 175, at 1208.
191. Diane Bartz & Malathi Nayak, Eric Schmidt Defends Google at Senate
Antitrust Hearing, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2011, 4:06 PM), http://
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this Note expects that Google has not heard the last from the antitrust
authorities. When a remedy does come, whether from the agencies or
through the courts, we must be careful to avoid remedies like simple,
blanket prohibitions on self-promotion that risk stalling the internet in the
era of "ten blue links." Requiring Google to integrate its competitors into
its core search results would promote competition without intrusive
administrative interference, and it would protect consumer choice while
allowing online search to continue on its path toward becoming truly
universal.
